Elements of Crimes

Th e Objective and Subjective Elements of the War Crime of Pillaging
In the decision on the confi rmation of charges in the Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui case Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC elaborated on the defi nition and the requisite elements of 'the war crime of pillaging under Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the ICC Statute, 2 which is criminalized under the Rome Statute whether it is committed in international or internal armed confl ict. According to the Elements of Crimes, the war crime of pillaging requires proof of the following three elements: '(i) the perpetrator appropriated certain property; (ii) the perpe trator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal use; and (iii) the appropriation was without the consent of the owner'. Th e Pre-Trial Chamber held that the property must belong to an "enemy" or "hostile" party to the confl ict. Th erefore, the pillaged property -whether moveable or immoveable, private or public -must belong to "individuals or entities who are aligned with or whose allegiance is to a party to the confl ict who is adverse or hostile to the perpetrator". 3 According to the Pre-Trial Chamber the crime encompasses both dolus directus of the fi rst degree and of the second degree. Th e Chamber further found that the war crime of pillaging is a "specifi c intent" crime which requires proof of dolus specialis on the part of the perpetrator with regard to two elements: 'First, the act of physical appropriation must be carried out with the intent to deprive the owner of his property. Second, the act of physical appropriation must also be carried out with the intent to utilise the appropriated property for private or personal use'. 
Persons Hors de Combat Can Be Victims of Both Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes
Can persons hors de combat be victims of a crime against humanity? Despite the extensive case-law of the Tribunals in relation to crimes against humanity, this question had remained unsettled until October 2008 when the Appeals Chamber in the Martić case rendered its judgement.
In the trial judgement of 12 June 2007 the Martić Trial Chamber had relied on rulings of the Appeals Chamber in the Galić and Blaškić cases when dealing with the issue. It held that persons hors de combat , while being protected in armed confl icts through Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, are not "civilians" in the context of international humanitarian law. 5 Since persons hors de combat are still members of the armed forces of a party to the confl ict, they fall under the category of persons referred to in Article 4(A)(1) of the Th ird Geneva Convention and, as such, are not civilians in the context of Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I. 6 In contrast, the Appeals Chamber in the Kordić and Čerkez case appeared to have expanded the term "civilian" to cover persons hors de combat . not only defi ne the notion "civilian" for the purposes of Common Article 3 crimes, but also for the purposes of crimes against humanity, namely for the chapeau requirement "civilian population". Th e Appeals Chamber reasoned that the fundamental character of the notion "civilian" both in international humanitarian law and international criminal law militates against giving it diff ering meanings. 8 However, the question whether only "civilians" may be victims of crimes against humanity is a second issue which must be discussed separately. While the chapeau requirement of crimes against humanity is that the acts of the accused form part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population, this requirement does not necessarily imply, in the Appeals Chamber's view, that the criminal acts within the attack must be committed against civilians only.
In that regard, it is worth noting that the presence of combatants within a civilian population does not necessarily deprive the population of its civilian character. 9 It is conceivable that criminal acts are committed against persons hors de combat who are present within the civilian population.
Th e Appeals Chamber found that the drafters of the Statute did not intend to exclude persons hors de combat from the purview of crimes against humanity. 10 It consequently held that persons hors de combat could be victims of crimes against humanity and found that this approach has already been implicitly followed by the Tribunal in a number of cases. 
War Crime of Collective Punishment (the Notion of "Punishment")
Th e Appeals Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL), by majority, held that the Trial Chamber erred in law in its defi nition of the crime of collective punishments, and overturned Fofana's and Kondewa's convictions for that crime. Th e Appeals Chamber emphasised that the notion "punishment" is an 'indiscriminate punishment imposed collectively on persons for omissions or acts for which some or none of them may or may not have been responsible'.
12 As such, "punishment" is distinct from the targeting of protected persons as objects of attack. Th e targeting of protected persons as objects of war crimes and crimes against humanity may not necessarily be predicated upon a perceived transgression by such persons and therefore does not constitute collective punishment.
13
Th us, the mens rea element of collective punishments represents the critical diff erence between the war crime of collective punishment and the act of targeting. While targeting takes place on account of who the victims are, or are perceived to be, the crime of collective punishments occurs in response to the acts or omissions of protected persons, whether real or perceived. 
Other Inhumane Acts / Forced Marriage
Th e SCSL Appeals Chamber in the Brima et al. case reversed the fi nding of the Trial Chamber that had interpreted forced marriage as a crime of sexual nature, covered and completely subsumed in the crime of sexual slavery in Article 2(g) of the SCSL Statute. Th e Trial Chamber also found that Article 2(i) of the SCSL Statute, other inhumane acts, must be restrictively interpreted to exclude crimes of a sexual nature.
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Th e Appeals Chamber held that, while forced marriage shares certain elements with sexual slavery such as non-consensual sex and deprivation of liberty, forced marriage is not adequately characterised as the crime against humanity of sexual slavery. Forced marriage involves a perpetrator compelling a person through his words or conduct, or those of someone for whose actions he is responsible, into a forced conjugal association with another person. Unlike sexual slavery, forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the "husband" and "wife", which could lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this exclusive arrangement. 16 Th ese distinctions imply, in the Appeals Chamber's view, that forced marriage is not predominantly a sexual crime, but is properly characterised as inhumane acts. 17 It also held that acts of forced marriage were of similar gravity to several enumerated crimes against humanity.
Astonishingly, the Appeals Chamber declined to enter new convictions on that ground. Th e Appeals Chamber stated that 'it is convinced that society's disapproval of the forceful abduction and use of women and girls as forced conjugal partners as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, is adequately refl ected by recognising that such conduct is criminal and that it constitutes an "Other Inhumane Act" capable of incurring individual criminal responsibility in international law". 18
Other Inhumane Acts Is Not a "Catch All Provision"
In the case of Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui the Prosecution charged both suspects (now accused) with the commission of crimes against humanity, namely, inhumane acts of intentionally infl icting serious injuries upon civilian pursuant to Article 7(1)(k) of the ICC Statute. PTC I noted that 'the [ICC] Statute has given to 'other inhumane acts' a diff erent scope than its antecedents like the Nuremberg Charter and the ICTR and ICTY Statutes. Th e latter conceived "other inhumane acts" as a "catch all provision", leaving a broad margin for the jurisprudence to determine its limits. In contrast, the Rome Statute contains certain limitations, as regards to the action constituting inhumane acts and the consequence required as a result of that action'.
19 PTC I noted that the ICC Statute defi nes the conduct under Article 7(1)(k) as " other " inhumane acts, which according to the PTC I indicates that none of the acts constituting crimes against humanity under Article 7(1)(a) to (j) can be simultaneously considered as an other inhumane act encompassed by Article 7(1)(k) of the Statute. Th us, murder as a crime against humanity, even if in its attempted form, cannot be charged simultaneously under Article 7(1)(k) of the ICC Statute as other inhumane acts.
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Based on the evidence tendered by the Prosecution, the majority of PTC I found that the attack on Bogoro was conducted in indiscriminately way using machetes, fi rearms and heavy weapons against civilians and that the attackers had the specifi c intent to kill such civilians rather than the intent to cause severe injuries.
21 Th e majority of the Chamber were of the opinion that 'the clear intent to kill persons cannot be transformed into intent to severely injure persons by means of inhumane acts solely on the basis that the result of the conduct was diff erent from that which was intended and pursued by the perpetrators'. 
Individual Criminal Responsibility
Stretching the Coundaries of Commission Liability
23
Th e ICTR Appeals Chamber, by majority, quashed the Trial Chamber's fi nding that Seromba , a Catholic priest at Nyange Parish, aided and abetted genocide and held that he instead committed genocide as well as extermination as a crime against humanity, by virtue of his role in the destruction of the church in Nyange Parish. 24 Pursuant to these fi ndings, the Appeals Chamber quashed the sentence of fi fteen years' imprisonment and entered a sentence of life imprisonment.
Th e Appeals Chamber recalled that "committing" is not limited to physical or direct perpetration and that other acts can constitute direct perpetration in the actus reus of the crime of genocide. 25 It found that the Trial Chamber applied the wrong legal standard when it held that committing required direct and physical perpetration. In the Appeals Chamber's view, the accused is a principal perpetrator of genocide if his actions were 'as much an integral part of the genocide as were the killings which [they] enabled'. 26 When applying this legal standard to the factual fi ndings of the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber came to the conclusion that Seromba 'approved and embraced as his own' the decision to destroy the church in order to kill Tutsi refugees and was not an aidor and abettor but became a principal perpetrator. 27 It held that it was irrelevant that Seromba did not personally drive the bulldozer that destroyed the church. What was important was that Seromba 'fully exercised his infl uence over the bulldozer driver' who accepted Seromba as the only authority and whose directions he followed. 28 As for the mens rea , the Appeals Chamber found that Seromba intended that the Tutsi be killed and also acted with the requisite specifi c intent to destroy in whole or in part the Tutsi group. 29 widened the scope of "committing", a mode of liability that was so far mainly reserved for "hands-on perpetrators".
30 Th e fi nding that "committing" must constitute principal perpetration is a valuable clarifi cation of the scope of that mode of liability that goes beyond the context of genocide. Persons, who did not directly or physically take part in the commission of crimes but whose actions appear as an "integral part" of the commission of the crimes or who assume a "central role"
31 in the events, are adequately described as principal perpetrators. Further, this broader understanding of "committing" has the eff ect that the mens rea becomes the distinctive criterion. While an aidor and abettor acts with the knowledge that his actions will assist the principal perpetrator in the commission of the crime, a principal perpetrator himself must have the intent to commit the crime or in the Appeals Chamber's words must "approve and embrace" the crime "as his own".
Joint Criminal Enterprise Objective Need Not Be Criminal as Long as the Means Contemplated to Achieve It Are Crimes Within the SCSL Statute
Th e SCSL Appeals Chamber in the Brima et al. case reversed the fi nding of the Trial Chamber that the Prosecution had not properly pleaded joint criminal enterprise.
32 Th e Trial Chamber had found, in particular, that a common purpose to 'gain and exercise political power and control over the territory of Sierra Leone' was not an international crime or a criminal purpose recognised by the Statute.
33 Th e SCSL Appeals Chamber held that the criminal purpose underlying the joint criminal enterprise need not derive from its ultimate objective, but may also derive from the means contemplated to achieve that objective. 34 Although the objective of gaining and exercising political power and control over the territory of Sierra Leone may not be a crime under the Statute, in the Appeals Chamber's view, the actions contemplated as a means to achieve that objective were crimes within the Statute. Nevertheless, the Appeals 30) It should also be noted that the participation in a joint criminal enterprise is implicit in Article 7(1) ( Prosecutor v. Tadić , Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgement, 17 July 1999, paras 188-191). In the absence of alleged participation in a joint criminal enterprise, an accused, who did not physically or directly took part in the commission of the crimes, could be found to have "encouraged", "assisted" or instigated the commission of the crime. Chamber did not see any need to make further factual fi ndings or to remit the case to the Trial Chamber for that purpose, having regard to the interests of justice.
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It is worth pointing out that the fi nding of the Appeals Chamber that joint criminal enterprise is a means of committing a crime and not a crime in itself is in line with the jurisprudence of other international tribunals. 
Control Over the Crime Approach: Th e Katanga Decision
In Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui the PTC I analysed principal responsibility under Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute (see Chart no. 1 below). Based on the Lubanga Decision, 37 the PTC I found that 'when a criminal off ence is committed by a plurality of persons, the defi nitional criterion of the concept "joint commission" is linked to the distinguishing criterion between principals and accessories to a crime'. 
Commission Th rough Another Person -Perpetrator Behind the Perpetrator by Means of Control Over an Organisation
In defi ning the elements for the commission of the crime through another person the Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui PTC I based its fi ndings mainly on German law and literature ( mittelbare Täterschaft ).
39 Mittelbare Täterschaft or perpetration by means, also known as 'indirect perpetration' or 'indirect perpetratorship', is characterized by the predominance of the perpetrator-by-means ( Hintermann ), who uses the person that physically carries out the crime ( Tatmittler ) as his instrument. 40 Th e perpetrator by means "controls the situation because he has superior knowledge or superior powers in relation to the agent". 41 However, 'indirect perpetratorship' is not limited to situations where the physical perpetrator is an innocent agent, or has a defence such as insanity or infancy. In such cases, an innocent agent is a "mere machine whose movements are regulated by the principal". 42 Rather, the notion of indirect perpetration also applies even where the direct and physical perpetrator is criminally responsible ('indirect' perpetrator behind the 'direct' perpetrator or Täter hinter dem Täter ). 43 According to the Katanga PTC this latter scenario, Täter hinter dem Täter , is the most relevant to international criminal law "in which the perpetrator behind the perpetrator a) Th e agent is not fulfi lling either the actus reus or mens rea of the off ence. b) Th e agent lacks a specifi c mens rea component or has a mens rea for a diff erent off ence. c) Th e agent is acting objectively lawfully ( rechtmäßig ) under an accepted defence. d) Th e agent is acting without personal guilt ( schuldos ) under an accepted defence. e) Th e agent lacks criminal capacity.
commits the crime through another by means of 'control over an organisation' ( Organisationsherrschaft )". 44 Th e PTC I found that the commission of the crime through another person -the third variant of principal liability under Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute -encompasses the perpetrator behind the perpetrator by means of control over an organisation. 45 In the Chamber's view, it was the intention of the drafters of the ICC Statute that Article 25(3)(a) encompasses commission "through a non-innocent individual" acting as an instrument, and also perpetration by means of control over an organisation. 46 According to the Chamber, the framework of the Statute, by specifi cally "regulating the commission of a crime through another responsible person," targets the category of cases which involves a perpetrator's control over the organisation". 47 Moreover, national jurisdictions such as Germany have relied on the concept of perpetration through control over an organisation in order to hold the leaders or highest authorities within an organisation responsible as a principal perpetrator. 48 Further, the Pre-Trial Chamber takes the Stakić Trial Judgement as proof of the application of the doctrine, although the judgement was overturned on appeal on the ground that the doctrine did not form part of customary international law. In the Pre-Trial Chamber's view, the question whether the "perpetrator behind the perpetrator" and "perpetration through control over an organisation" doctrine was part of international customary law was "not relevant" for the ICC since the ICC Statute, forming the fi rst source of applicable law for the ICC according to Article 21, expressly provided for that specifi c mode of liability. 49 Finally, the Pre-Trial Chamber referred to the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Bemba Gomba case which endorsed the mode of liability. 50 Th e Pre-Trial Chamber went on defi ning the requirements of perpetration by means of control over an organisation. It held that the organisation must be based on hierarchical relations between superiors and subordinates and that the organisation must consist of suffi cient subordinates to guarantee that superior's orders will inevitably be carried out, if not by one subordinate, then by another.
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In addition, the Chamber held that the main characteristic of this kind of organisation is a mechanism that enables its highest authorities to ensure automatic compliance with their orders. 52 In the words of Professor Roxin: "Such Organisation develops namely a life that is independent of the changing composition of its members. It functions, without depending on the individual identity of the executant, as if it were automatic".
53 Th e leader's ability to secure this automatic compliance with his orders is the basis for his liability as a principal. According to the Chamber "[t]he highest authority does not merely order the commission of a crime, but through his control over the organisation, essentially decides whether and how the crime would be committed".
54
Th e Chamber also held that automatic compliance with the orders may also be achieved "through intensive, strict, and violent training regimens", thus opening the mode of liability to include perpetrators like Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui who are charged with the crime of using children under the age of fi fteen to take actively participate in the hostilities and who have allegedly secured compliance with their orders through the abduction of minors who were subjected to punishing training regimens in which they were taught to commit crimes.
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As regards the mental elements, the Chamber held that the persons must be aware of the factual circumstances enabling them to exercise control over the crime through another person, such as the character of the organisation, their authority within the organisation, and the factual circumstances enabling nearautomatic compliance with their orders.
56 Th e mode of liability "commission of a crime through another person by means of control over an organisation" has the potential to became most relevant to international criminal law, in particular since the PTC held that it can also be committed "jointly".
57 It appears that it may even substitute the JCE liability which is extensively used by the adhoc Tribunals but in relation to which the ICC has already raised reservations. 
Superior Responsibility
In 2008 the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY issued three important judgements, in which it further refi ned the requirements for superior responsibility, namely, in Orić , Hadžihasanović &Kubura , and Strugar cases. 
Identifi cation of Subordinates
Th e Appeals Chamber in the Orić case held that, while it is not necessary to identify the subordinates in person, at least "their existence" must be established before superior responsibility can arise.
59 Th e Appeals Chamber reversed the conviction of Naser Orić for crimes committed by the Military Police because the Trial Chamber did not mention the potentially culpable members of the Military Police but only established the existence of the Military Police as an entity.
60
Th e identifi cation of the subordinates and fi nding of their criminal responsibility is particularly important in cases where subordinates of the accused are alleged to be criminally responsible for the crimes of direct perpetrators who are not subordinates of the accused. 
Eff ective Control -No Reversal of the Burden of Proof in Case of a De Jure Superior
In the seminal Čelibići case, the Appeals Chamber held that in general, the possession of de jure power in itself may not suffi ce for the fi nding of command responsibility if it does not manifest in eff ective control, although a court may presume that possession of such power prima facie results in eff ective control unless proof to the contrary is produced".
62 Th e Appeals Chamber in the Hadžihasanović & Kubura case confi rmed the fi nding in the Čelebići case, but clarifi ed that there is no legal presumption and no reversal of the burden of proof.
63 Th e Appeals Chamber in the Orić case also stated that de jure authority is not synonymous with eff ective control. While the possession of de jure authority may suggest a material ability to prevent or punish, it may be neither necessary nor suffi cient to prove such ability. De jure authority only provides "some evidence" of eff ective control. 64 It is noteworthy that the Appeals Chamber in the Hadžihasanović and Kubura case even declined to address whether one of the accused had de jure authority arguing that " de jure authority is only one factor that helps to establish eff ective control, and because the present question is resolvable on the basis of eff ective control alone". 65 
Eff ective Control or Cooperation? Military Benefi ts Achieved through Independent Units not a Factor to Consider
Both in the Hadžihasanović & Kubura case and in the Delić case, it was in dispute whether the accused exercised eff ective control over Mujahedin detachments, which fought alongside with the units of the accused, and whether the accused were responsible for crimes committed by these detachments. Th e issue was whether the accused bear responsibility since they benefi ted militarily from the cooperation with those units.
Th e Appeals Chamber clarifi ed that the alleged benefi t from the cooperation with other units is not a relevant factor when assessing whether the superior had eff ective control. 66 It added that it may entail "some form of responsibility" if "the particulars of such responsibility are adequately pleaded in an Indictment". However, ultimately the superior responsibility is only triggered upon a showing of eff ective control. 67 In the Hadžihasanović & Kubura case, the Appeals Chamber found that the relationship between the accused and the Mujahedin detachment was one of cooperation and did not evolve into a superior-subordinate-relationship. 68 In the Delić case, the majority found that the Mujahedin detachment was not an independent unit merely cooperating with the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although it enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. 69 Th e majority found that Delić exercised eff ective control over the Mujahedin and was, therefore, criminally responsible for a number of crimes committed by the Mujahedin. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Moloto considered that the relationship between the Mujahedin detachment and the Army of Bosnia was throughout one of cooperation rather than one of eff ective control. 70 
"Had Reason to Know" Due to a Failure to Punish Past Crimes
If superiors do not punish past crimes, subordinates may understand that failure as acceptance or even encouragement and might continue committing crimes.
However, as the Appeals Chamber held in Krnojelac , the failure to punish a past crime cannot be taken as proof of knowledge that similar crimes would be committed in the future. It may be taken as "alarming information" to justify further inquiry. 71 Th e Appeals Chamber in the Hadžihasanović & Kubura case further clarifi ed that this does not mean that the superior's failure to punish past crimes automatically constitutes suffi ciently alarming information to meet the threshold of "had reason to know". It held that the assessment has to take into account the circumstances of the case. 
Superior Responsibility for Crimes Committed Before Superior Had Eff ective Control
Superiors may not be held responsible for crimes committed before they assumed command and exercised eff ective control. Th is was the debatable fi nding of the Appeals Chamber in a jurisdiction decision in the Hadžihasanović & Kubura case of July 2003 that was reached by majority. 73 In the Orić appeal, the issue came back to the Appeals Chamber. Th e Prosecution argued that the Trial Chamber erred in law when it found that Orić could not be held responsible for crimes, of which he had knowledge, because they were perpetrated before he assumed eff ective control over the Military Police. 74 Th e majority of the Appeals Chamber in the Orić case declined to address the issue arguing that the ratio decidendi in the Hadžihasanović case could not have an impact on the outcome of the case. 75 Judge Schomburg and Judge Liu dissented holding that the Appeals Chamber should have discussed the validity of the ratio decidendi as a matter of general signifi cance. Judge Shahabuddeen did not formally dissent, but attached a declaration. 76 In substance, all three judges agreed that the fi nding of the Appeals Chamber in the Hadžihasanović case was wrong, thus forming a "silent" reversing majority. Judge Liu and Judge Schomburg demonstrated that the restriction in the In his declaration, Judge Shahabuddeen puts the question whether a judge who dissented in one decision can subsequently properly form part of a reversing majority and comes to the conclusion that, in the circumstances of the case, "a reversal should await such time when a more solid majority". Declaration, paras. 13-15.
Hadžihasanović decision does not refl ect customary international law and defeats the object and purpose behind the concept of superior responsibility which is to ensure compliance with the laws and customs of war and international humanitarian law in general. 77 Th e Appeals Chamber in the Hadžihasanović case was wrong to point to missing state practice and/or opino iuris . It is not an objection to the application of the principle to a particular situation to say that the situation is new if it reasonably falls within the application of the principle. In fact, the framework indicating the customary rule already existed. 
Rights of the Accused
Right of the Accused to Receive Material in a Language He or She Understands
An accused has the right to use his mother tongue in written and oral communications with the organs of the Tribunal and to receive relevant material in a language the accused understands. Th is is laid down in the Statute of the Tribunals which reproduce Article 14(3)(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, the accused may not demand the production of documents in any language or script that he or she chooses. Th is was held by the Appeals Chamber in a decision in the Tolimir case. 79 In the Karadžić case, the Trial Chamber was seised of a similar request by Karadžić to be provided with all materials, including transcripts of the sessions in his case, as well as other transcripts which might be necessary for him to prepare his defence, in the Serbian language and in the Cyrillic script. Th e Trial Chamber stated that an accused it not entitled to receive all documents in a language he understands, but only certain documents, such as the indictment and the material supporting the indictment, witness material and all orders and decisions rendered by the Trial Chamber. 
Right to Self-Representation -Assignment of Counsel in the Interests of Justice
It is worth noting that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY have been amended and now include a new Rule 45 ter relating to the right to selfrepresentation. 81 Rule 45 ter reads: "Th e Trial Chamber may, if it decides that it is in the interests of justice, instruct the Registrar to assign a counsel to represent the interests of the accused".
Th e adoption of Rule 45 ter eventually brings the rules of the ICTY in conformance with rules and practise of other international tribunals such as the ICTR, the ICC and the SCSL 82 and incorporates existing case-law of the ICTY into a common rule. Th e ICTY has acknowledged limitations of the right to selfrepresentation in a number of cases. 
Fitness to Stand Trial -Fitness to Represent Oneself
Th e accused's fi tness to stand trial is of great importance. Th e Appeals Chamber in the Strugar case held that the fi tness to stand trial may generally be regarded as an issue that would signifi cantly aff ect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial.
84 Th e applicable standard for assessing the fi tness of the accused is that of "meaningful participation" which allows the accused to "exercise his fair trial rights to such a degree that he is able to participate eff ectively in his trial, and has an understanding of the essentials of the proceedings".
85 Th e Appeals Chamber emphasised that the fi tness to stand trial must be distinguished from the fi tness to represent oneself. Th us, the accused need not have the capacity to fully comprehend the course of the proceedings in the trial, so as to make a proper defence, and to comprehend details of the evidence. Th e Appeals Chamber did not further dwell on the question what eff ect that distinction may have in relation to a self-represented accused who is fi t enough to stand trial but not fi t enough to represent himself. It can, however, be taken from the decision of the Appeals Chamber in the Milošević case that it would be appropriate to limit self-representation of an accused who is unfi t to represent himself and impose counsel provided that the curtailment of the right to self-representation is limited to the minimum extent possible. 
Primacy/Complementarity of International Tribunals and National Courts
Referral Under Rule 11 bis
Under Rule 11 bis of the respective Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the ICTY and ICTR may refer cases to the authorities of a state for trial. A Referral Bench considers the gravity of the crimes and the level of responsibility of the accused. It needs to be satisfi ed that the accused will receive a fair trial and that the death penalty will no be imposed or carried out.
No Referral to Rwanda
In three remarkable decisions, the ICTR Appeals Chamber upheld the decisions of the "Referral Bench" denying referral of two cases to the Republic of Rwanda arguing that the Rwandan penalty structure does not meet internationally recognised standards and that there are concerns whether the Accused would receive a fair trial. 88 On 8 October 2008, the ICTR Appeals Chamber in the Munyakazi case upheld the decision to deny the referral of the case to Rwanda. It held that the trial judges erred in fi nding that Rwanda does not respect the independence of the judiciary and that the composition of the courts in Rwanda does not accord with the right to be tried by an independent tribunal and the right to a fair trial. same conditions as witnesses called by the Prosecution, is concerned. It was not satisfi ed that the rights can be guaranteed at this time in Rwanda. It also was not satisfi ed whether the penalty structure in Rwanda is adequate for the purposes of transfer under Rule 11 bis of the Rules.
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Th e ICTR Appeals Chamber also upheld the decision in the Kanyarukiga case denying referral to Rwanda. It stated that "there is genuine ambiguity about which punishment provision would apply to transfer cases, and therefore the possibility exists that Rwandan courts might hold that a penalty of life imprisonment in isolation would apply to such cases".
91 Th e Appeals Chamber also found that " Kanyarukiga might face diffi culties in obtaining witnesses residing within Rwanda because they would be afraid to testify, and that he would not be able to call witnesses residing outside Rwanda, to the extent and in a manner that would ensure a fair trial". 92 On 5 December 2008, the Appeals Chamber upheld the decision in the Hategekimana case to deny referral to Rwanda.
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Th e decisions of the Appeal Chamber caused repercussions. Arrested earlier this year in Germany at the request of the Rwandan authorities, Onesphore Rwabukombe and Callixte Mbarushimana were set free by the German authorities because the Rule 11 bis decisions of the Appeals Chamber made it impossible to extradite the two persons or to hold them any longer in custody.
Procedure and Evidence
Retrial of a Case Ordered for the First Time
For the fi rst time in the history of international criminal tribunals, retrial of a case was ordered. Th e Appeals Chamber in the Muvunyi case quashed Muvunyi's conviction for direct and public incitement to commit genocide based on a speech he gave at the Gikore Trade Center in Rwanda and ordered a retrial limited to the allegations considered in relation to this incident. Th e Appeals Chamber criticized the Trial Chamber for not having given a reasoned opinion for its fi ndings, thus making it impossible for the Appeals Chamber to determine whether the Trial Chamber assessed the entire evidence on this point exhaustively and properly. 94 Notably, the Appeals Chamber also ordered, in the event that a new Trial Chamber was to enter a conviction for the respective charge, that any sentence should not exceed the sentence imposed by the fi rst Trial Chamber ( reformatio in peius consideration). 95 
Stay of Proceedings Ordered in the Lubanga Case
On 13 June 2008 the ICC Trial Chamber in the Lubanga Dyilo case decided to stay the proceedings, and on 2 July 2008 ordered the unconditional release of Lubanga Dyilo .
96 Th e Trial Chamber found that the Prosecution breached its disclosure obligation towards the Defence and the Chamber with regard to over 200 documents of potentially exculpatory material and that it entered into inappropriate agreements with information-providers, including the UN. As the disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the possession of the Prosecution is a fundamental aspect of the accused's right to a fair trial, the Trial Chamber found a stay of the proceedings was inevitable.
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In its decision 21 October 2008 the ICC Appeals Chamber confi rmed the decision of the Trial Chamber on the stay of proceedings. It found that a conditional stay of the proceedings may be the appropriate remedy "where a fair trial cannot be held at the time that the stay is imposed, but where the unfairness to the accused is of such nature that a fair trial might become possible at a later stage". 148. Th e Trial Chamber had based its fi ndings on the evidence of just two witnesses who were inconsistent in their testimony about Muvunyi's speech. Without having properly discussed the inconsistencies in their testimony, the Trial Chamber found that the testimony of the two witnesses was "strikingly similar". Moreover, the Trial Chamber had rejected the evidence of one exculpatory witness without having discussed the credibility and reliability of that witness. Regarding the second issue, the Appeals Chamber, by majority, reversed the 2 July 2008 decision on the release of Lubanga Dyilo and decided to send the matter back to the Trial Chamber for a new decision on the question of his release. It held that in case of a conditional stay of the proceedings, the release of the accused is not the only "inevitable" consequence and the only "correct course" to take. Th e decision whether to release the accused must be taken in accordance with the articles and rules governing the detention of the accused prior to conviction.
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On 18 November 2008 Trial Chamber I decided not to grant the release or provisional release of Lubanga Dyilo. Th e accused will remain under the custody of the Court until the beginning of the trial which has been provisionally scheduled to start 26 January 2009. Trial Chamber I also decided to lift the stay of proceedings; it held that the reasons for imposing a halt "have fallen away". 
Disclosure of Potentially Exculpatory Material Obtained by the Prosecution Th rough Confi dentiality Agreements
In the Lubanga Dyilo case, the Prosecution made extensive use of a provision allowing the Prosecution not to disclose material obtained through confi dentiality agreements with information-providers.
101 Th e Trial Chamber held that instead of resorting to that provision exceptionally and for the sole purpose of generating new evidence, the Prosecution had used the provision "routinely, in inappropriate circumstances".
102
Th e ICC Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga Dyilo case acknowledged a potential tension between the confi dentiality to which the Prosecutor agreed in confidentiality agreements with information-providers and the requirements of a fair trial. 103 In the Appeals Chamber's view, in order to resolve the tension, the Trial Chamber has to be provided with the material in question in order to assess whether the material must be disclosed to the accused, had it not be obtained on the condition of confi dentiality. However, the Trial Chamber shall respect the confi dentiality agreement and shall not order the disclosure of the material without prior consent of the information-provider. If the information-provider does not consent to the disclosure, the Trial Chamber will then have to determine which counter-balancing measures can be taken to ensure that the rights of the accused are protected and that the trial is fair. 104 
Contact Between Counsel and Accused Appearing as a Witness in Th eir Own Defence
In the Prlić et al. case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that an accused who appears in his own defence must not be deprived of the assistance of his counsel during his testimony. It is a fundamental right of an accused to have access to counsel "at any stage of the proceedings". 105 Th is ruling overturns case-law of the Tribunal limiting the contact between the counsel and the accused while the latter is taking the stand in his own defence. Th is case-law was not only based on the general prohibition of contact between witnesses and the parties during the course of their testimony, but also on the concern that coaching of the accused by his counsel may render the accused's testimony unreliable. 106 According to the Appeals Chamber, the general prohibition of contact between a witness and the parties during the testimony does not per se bar communication between an accused testifying in his own defence and his counsel. Further, it held that the reliability of the accused's testimony may be tested during cross-examination when the Prosecution can seek to establish that the accused was improperly coached by his counsel on how to respond to questions. 107 Th e Appeals Chamber also pointed to the general presumption that conversations between the accused and his counsel are "appropriate". 108 Presumably, it is not easy to establish that communications between an accused and his counsel were not "appropriate". Th e ambiguity of the term "appropriate" led Judge Shahabuddeen and Judge Vaz to attach a joint declaration indicating that the term "appropriate" must not be understood to mean that counsel could advice the accused on how to respond to questions.
Impeachment of One's Own Witness -Discretion of the Trial Chamber
Is a party to proceedings before international criminal tribunals allowed to "impeach" its own witness? Must it seek permission to do so? Th e ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Popović et al. held that, while impeachment of one's own witness is permitted in general, it is for the Trial Chamber to determine whether to allow the calling party to cross-examine its own witness and to limit, where appropriate, the scope of the questioning. 109 It thereby reversed the decision of the Trial Chamber that it is for each party, albeit at their own peril, to determine to what extent the credibility of a witness is to be challenged. 110 In the Appeals Chamber's view, leaving the impeachment in the hands of the calling party would preclude the other party to object to the impeachment or to the scope of the crossexamination. 111 Whether the witness must be declared "hostile" prior to crossexamination is, in the Appeals Chamber's view, also a matter to be determined by the Trial Chamber. 112 Th e Appeals Chamber in the Popović et al. case further held that evidence adduced through the cross-examination of a party's own witness may not only be received as evidence for assessing the credibility of the witness, but may also be considered in relation to substantive issues. 113 It is within the Trial Chamber's discretion to decide for what purposes the evidence is admitted. 114 
Witnesses Called During Appellate Proceedings -Karadžić Testifi es in the Krajišnik Case
Th e ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Krajišnik case allowed Krajišnik to call Karadžić as a witness during the appellate proceedings. Th e Trial Chamber had convicted Krajišnik of crimes against humanity, including the murder, persecution and extermination carried out by the Bosnian Serb regime against Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats during 1992, but acquitted him of genocide charges.
Th e Appeals Chamber considered that the requirements for hearing additional evidence tendered on appeal were satisfi ed, namely that Karadžić's evidence had been "unavailable" at trial. Further, his evidence was prima facie credible, relevant and probative and that it also could have a potential impact on the verdict. 115 Karadžić's evidence in the Krajišnik case was closely related to the facts that he himself is charged with. Th us, his testimony had a tendency to be incriminating. Th e Appeals Chamber therefore directed the Registry to inquire whether Karadžić wished to exercise his right to be assisted by counsel and to assign counsel in that case. 116 During his testimony Karadžić was represented by counsel who objected to several questions put to Karadžić on the grounds that the accused could incriminate himself by answering.
Victim Participation
On 11 July 2008 the ICC Appeals Chamber rendered a signifi cant decision in relation to victim participation. It held that the harm suff ered by victims does not necessarily have to be direct and may also be indirect, provided that it is personal. Material, physical and psychological harm are all forms of harm that fall within the rule, if they are suff ered personally by the victim. 117 Th us, for example, the recruitment of a child soldier may result in personal suff ering of both the child and the parents of the child. 118 Th e Appeals Chamber further held that only victims who are victims of the crimes charged may participate in the trial proceedings and reversed the decision of the Trial Chamber in that regard. Unlike Rule 85(A) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the provision defi ning who is a victim, 119 Article 68(3) of the ICC Statute restricts participation of victims in that it requires that personal interests of the victims are aff ected. Th us, on the basis of the "Rome Statute framework", the harm alleged by a victim and the concept of personal interests in Article 68(3) of the ICC Statute must be linked with the charged confi rmed against the accused.
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Th irdly, the Appeals Chamber held that victims may lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused when requested and that they may also challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence in the trial proceedings, but only upon a showing that personal interests would be negatively aff ected. 121 Although it is primarily the parties who lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the Appeals Chamber found that this does not preclude the possibility for victims to lead evidence. Victims have to make a discrete application, give notice to the parties, comply with disclosure obligations and protection orders, show appropriateness and consistency with the rights of the accused, and, last not least, demonstrate their personal interests. 122 In the Appeals Chamber's view, in order to "give eff ect to the spirit and intention of Article 68(3)" it must be interpreted as to make participation "meaningful". 123 In his partly dissenting opinion, Judge Pikis disagreed with the majority that the harm suff ered could also be indirect and stated that he would require a "direct nexus" between the crime and the harm.
124 Judge Pikis also disagreed that victims may lead evidence pertaining to the guilt of innocence of the accused and to challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence. In his view, victims are not made parties to the proceedings and their participation is confi ned to expressing their views and concerns. years. In October 2008, the Trial Chamber of the SCSL had sentenced Fofana to a total of six years and Kondewa to a total of eight years. As former leaders of the government-supported Civil Defence Forces during Sierra Leone's armed confl ict both men in August 2007 were convicted of war crimes. When imposing the sentences, the Trial Chamber considered that the accused should receive a reduced sentence because they fought for a "legitimate cause", namely to "restore the democratically elected Government".
Th e Appeals Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber's ruling, considering that the political motivations of the Accused in committing international law violations cannot be considered as a mitigating factor. 126 While the motive of the accused, as a general principle, may be considered as a mitigating factor, the particular motive of "just cause" may not.
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Th e decision constitutes an important correction of a patently wrong consideration by the Trial Chamber. As the Appeals Chamber held, international humanitarian law specifi cally removes a party's political motive and the "justness" of a party's cause from consideration; in fact, accepting "just causes" would "undermine the bedrock principle of that law". 
Aggravating Circumstance -Accused Was in a Prominent Public Position of Trust
Nchamihigo was deputy prosecutor of Cyangugu prefecture in Rwanda. Th e Trial Chamber found Nchamihigo criminally responsible for genocide, extermination, murder and other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Th e Trial Chamber noted, in particular, that the accused was in a prominent public position of trust, and was expected to uphold the rule of law, yet he exhibited zeal in the perpetration of these grave crimes. Th us, he promoted an "environment of impunity".
